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The 1990s have hardly been a boom period for house
prices in the Second District.  Between 1990 and 1997,
the median real, or inflation-adjusted, price for a 
single-family home there dropped 20 percent. Within
the District, prices in the New York metropolitan area
declined 24 percent and those in upstate New York fell
an average of 20 percent (Table 1).1 Yet while Second
District house prices fell during the period, real prices
for the nation rose 5 percent overall.
In this edition of Second District Highlights, we
investigate two possible explanations for the sharp dis-
parity between national and local house-price trends 
during the 1990s. First, we consider the influence of
weaknesses in the economic “fundamentals” thought to
determine prices, such as real personal income growth
and unemployment. Second, we examine the possibility
that Second District house-price growth was depressed
by a prolonged, unpleasant hangover from the exces-
sively rapid house-price growth enjoyed in the 1980s—
growth that may have been caused by a speculative bubble.
We find that poor economic fundamentals explain
about half of the relative weakness of house prices in
the New York metropolitan area, while a post-boom
hangover in house prices accounts for the remainder.
The behavior of house prices in upstate New York, how-
ever, is less easily explained. Only about one-tenth of
the relative weakness of upstate prices can be attributed
to poor fundamentals and another third to the lingering
effects of excessive price rises in the 1980s. Drawing on
these findings, we also speculate on the reasons for the
upturn in District house-price growth in 1998.
THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS
A direct comparison of the nation and the Second
District indicates that economic fundamentals could
indeed have contributed to the poor performance of
District house prices in the 1990s.2 Both personal
income growth and unemployment performed worse in
the Second District than in the United States. Personal
income in New York State grew 9 percent between 1990
and 1997, but the national increase was more than 
double that figure.3 Meanwhile, the state’s unemploy-
ment rate rose 0.4 percentage point, even as the national
unemployment rate declined 1.4 percentage points.
We can assess more formally the success of eco-
nomic fundamentals in explaining the weakness of
Second District house prices during the 1990s. Using a
statistical model with 1982-97 data for fifty-two U.S.
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Table 1
Cumulative Real House-Price Growth in the Nation
and the Second District
Fourth-Quarter 1989 to Fourth-Quarter 1997
Area Percentage Change
United States 5.0
New York metro area -24.2





New York City suburbsa -10.0
Bergen-Passaic, New Jersey -4.5
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, New Jersey -7.0
Monmouth-Ocean, New Jersey -10.7
Nassau-Suffolk, New York -15.3
Newark, New Jersey -9.2
Notes:  Nominal house-price data are from the National Association of Realtors.
We deflated these figures by the corresponding state consumer price indexes.
aFigures for the New York City suburbs begin in the fourth quarter of 1990.
January 1999metropolitan areas—including Albany, Buffalo, New
York City, Rochester, and Syracuse—we estimate the
contribution of fundamentals to house-price growth.
The fundamental variables included in our model of
real house prices are real personal income, the unem-
ployment rate, real construction costs, real mortgage
interest rates, and expected house-price growth.4
Increases in personal income, construction costs, and
expected house-price growth would be expected to raise
house prices; increases in unemployment and real mort-
gage interest rates would be expected to lower them.5
We also include in our model the lagged difference
between actual house prices and the prices that would
be assigned on the basis of economic fundamentals
alone; we call this difference the house-price gap.
Inclusion of this variable is consistent with a growing
body of studies finding that house prices are affected by
factors other than those normally considered fundamen-
tal.6 Furthermore, the influence of the house-price gap
on house prices is straightforward: if prices become
more expensive than justified by fundamentals, demand
will dry up, forcing prices back down.7
The fundamental variables in our model are found to
be important determinants of house prices (Table 2). All
fundamental variables are estimated to affect house
prices in the expected direction, and the magnitudes of
the effects seem plausible.8 For example, a 1 percent
increase in personal income is estimated to raise house
prices roughly 0.5 percent, while an increase of 1 per-
centage point in the unemployment rate is estimated to
lower prices 0.7 percent.
Our results also enable us to investigate whether weak
fundamentals explain why house prices in the Second
District have lagged those of the nation. To do this, we
calculate the difference between actual house-price
growth in the Second District and the United States as a
whole. We compare this figure with the corresponding
difference in house-price growth that would have been
predicted by the five fundamental variables alone.9
Our comparison reveals that weak fundamentals
accounted for roughly half of the 29 percent difference
between house-price growth in the New York metro 
area and the nation between 1990 and 1997 (Table 3).
However, in upstate New York, fundamentals were
apparently much less important. In fact, fundamentals
alone implied modest real house-price increases, other
things equal, rather than the substantial declines 
actually observed.10 Moreover, fundamentals upstate
accounted for only 3 of the 25 percentage points sepa-
rating local and national real house-price growth
between 1990 and 1997.
The inability of fundamentals to account for the rela-
tive weakness of upstate house prices is most pro-
nounced in Buffalo. There, price growth lagged the
nation’s by 22 percent, yet fundamentals would actually
have caused prices to rise 3 percent more than those
nationwide. Conversely, fundamentals were best able to
explain the relative house-price weakness in Albany,
where price growth trailed the nation’s by 27 percent.
Of this gap, roughly one-quarter—about 7 percentage
points—is explained by the fundamentals in our model.
Economic fundamentals such as personal income
growth and the unemployment rate evidently fail to
explain fully the relative weakness of Second District
house prices during the 1990s. Accordingly, we ask
whether this weakness might be explained in part by a




Determinants of House-Price Growth
in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1979-97
Alters real house-price growth
A change of this amount: by this amount (percent):
Fundamental variable
1 percent rise
in real personal income 0.52
1-percentage-point rise
in unemployment -0.70
1 percent rise in real 
construction costs 0.49
1-percentage-point rise
in real mortgage interest rates -1.12




in house-price gap -0.09
Notes:  The table reports the results of a panel regression using data from fifty-
two U.S. metropolitan areas. Fourth-quarter data were used where possible (for 
all variables except personal income). The house-price gap is defined as actual
house prices minus the houses’fundamental-consistent value. All coefficients are
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The adjusted R-squared for this
regression is 0.27, meaning that about one-quarter of the variation in annual real
house-price growth is accounted for by the variables in the table. The Durbin-
Watson statistic is 2.08, meaning that there is very little correlation between 
concurrent and lagged regression residuals.THE IMPACT OF THE 1980S BOOM
During the 1980s, Second District house prices exhib-
ited none of the relative weakness of the 1990s. In fact,
District house prices rose spectacularly from 1983 to
1989, while prices nationwide rose only modestly. In
the New York metro area, real house prices rose 63 per-
cent between 1983 and their 1987 peak—56 percentage
points more than national prices. Upstate, real house
prices rose 29 percent between 1983 and their 1989
peak—20 percentage points more than national prices. 
Much like the 1990s bust, the 1980s boom in Second
District house prices is not easily explained by eco-
nomic fundamentals. In the New York metro area, per-
sonal income growth and the unemployment rate
tracked the national averages.11 Similarly, the decline in
upstate New York’s unemployment rate during the 1983-
89 boom, while significant, was no larger than the
nationwide drop. Meanwhile, personal income grew
less rapidly upstate than it did in the nation.12 Results
from our model support this conclusion. Taken together,
our five fundamental variables explain only 9 percent-
age points of the 56 percent rise in real New York metro
area house prices relative to national prices from 1983
to 1987. Much the same is true upstate: real house
prices rose 20 percent more than national prices
between 1983 and 1989, but measured fundamentals
actually implied that real prices should have risen 1 per-
cent less than national prices. Because fundamentals
cannot explain the rapid run-up in Second District
house prices during the 1980s, we refer to the price rises
as “excessive.”
Were There House-Price Bubbles during the 1980s?
The sheer magnitude of the Second District’s boom,
combined with the inability of economic fundamentals
to explain the boom, has led many observers to con-
clude that 1980s house-price growth in the District was
inflated by a speculative bubble. In a speculative bubble,
asset prices rise beyond levels consistent with economic
fundamentals because of widespread expectations of
further price rises. Although it is not possible to prove
that such speculative forces had a major impact on the
behavior of house prices in the last decade, there is sta-
tistical evidence consistent with the more general argu-
ment that speculative bubbles could arise in U.S. house
prices.13 For example, Case and Shiller (1991), who
surveyed home buyers in California and Massachusetts
in 1988, determined that buyers were willing to pay
very high prices because they expected prices to rise
still further: “Investors in house markets do not know
fundamentals. . . . [Their] expectations do not make
sense except as extrapolations of past price changes” 
(p. 398).
In our model, the fact that house prices are estimated
to fall when they exceed fundamental-consistent 
values—that is, when the house-price gap is positive—
also supports the argument that speculative bubbles
could arise in U.S. house markets. In particular, accord-
ing to our estimates, a house-price gap of 1.0 percent 
is associated with a 0.09 percent house-price decline dur-
ing the following year, all else equal (Table 2). Note that
this result implies that house prices return to their funda-
mental values very slowly: half the gap between prices
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Table 3
Explaining the Differences in Real House-Price Growth in Second District Metropolitan Areas
and the Nation, 1990-97
Percent
House-Price Growth, Effect of Fundamentals, Effect of House-Price Gap,
Difference with Nation Difference with Nation Difference with Nation Explained Difference
Area (1) (2) (3) (4)
New York metro area -29.0 -15.9 -13.0 -28.9
Upstate New York -24.9 -2.8 -8.1 -10.9
Albany -26.8 -6.5 -13.2 -19.7
Buffalo -22.3 3.0 -8.1 -5.1
Rochester -22.0 -3.5 -3.8 -7.3
Syracuse -31.0 -6.1 -9.7 -15.8
Notes:  The table reports the contribution of two factors to the observed difference between house-price growth in Second District urban regions and house-price growth in the
nation. The first factor (column 2) is the difference between fundamentally determined house-price growth in the nation and fundamentally determined house-price growth
within the Second District. The second factor (column 3) is the difference between the house-price growth in the nation that is attributable to the deviation of the actual price of
houses from their fundamental value (as estimated for the fourth quarter of 1989) and the corresponding house-price growth for Second District urban regions. The figures in
column 4 reflect the sum of values in the previous two columns. Second district highlights
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and the value implied by fundamentals remains after
seven years, and one-third remains after twelve years.
Our results provide further insight into the possibility
that Second District house prices experienced a specula-
tive bubble during the late 1980s. To test this hypothesis,
we draw on an important attribute of these bubbles:
prices that rise the farthest above economic fundamen-
tals as the bubble inflates have the farthest to fall after it
bursts. Thus, if there was indeed a speculative bubble,
areas where house-price growth was most excessive rela-
tive to fundamental values during the boom should, dur-
ing the bust, be the same areas where house-price growth
fell the most relative to fundamental values. If we refer to
the portion of house-price growth not explained by fun-
damentals as “nonfundamental” house-price growth, we
can say that there should be a negative relationship
between nonfundamental house-price growth during the
boom and the bust.
A simple statistical analysis of our house-price data
provides results consistent with this hypothesis. We
compare cumulative nonfundamental real house-price
growth for 1983 through 1989 with corresponding non-
fundamental real house-price growth over 1990-97. As
predicted by the bubble hypothesis, prices that soared
the farthest above fundamentals during the 1980s boom
did fall the farthest during the subsequent bust: a 
10 percent nonfundamental price increase during the
boom was associated, on average, with a 5 percent non-
fundamental decline during the bust.14
How Did the 1980s Boom Affect House Prices in the
1990s? Whether or not one agrees with the conclusion
that speculative forces contributed significantly to the
excessive price rises of the 1980s, one could still argue
that the lingering effects of those rises compounded the
relative weakness of Second District house prices dur-
ing the 1990s: that is, if houses became unreasonably
expensive, demand would dry up, forcing prices down
again. Prices in the District peaked far above funda-
mental values in the 1980s: At their 1987 peak, New
York metro area prices were almost 40 percent above
estimated fundamental values (Table 4). Similarly,
when prices upstate peaked in 1989, they exceeded esti-
mated fundamental values by 17 percent. Meanwhile,
prices nationwide rose only a little more than 2 percent
above estimated fundamental values during the decade.
These findings lead us to ask, How much of the
Second District house-price weakness during the 1990s
can be explained by the late-1980s gap between actual
house prices and their fundamental-consistent values?
To answer this question, we calculate the size of these
gaps at the end of 1989, just prior to the opening of the
“bust” decade (Table 4). In the New York metro area,
the house-price gap stood above 20 percent; in upstate
New York, gaps ranged from 7 percent in Rochester to
25 percent in Albany. (Given our earlier finding that
prices revert only slowly to their fundamental values, it
is not surprising that the gaps remained quite large in
1989—generally well over 15 percent—even though
house prices in the area had begun to decline.)
The 1980s boom in Second District house prices 
evidently left its mark on 1990s prices. Our estimates
indicate that the excessive price rises of the 1980s
accounted for about half (13 percentage points) of the 
29 percent decline in New York metro area prices rela-
tive to the nation’s prices between 1990 and 1997
(Table 3). Upstate New York also felt the effects, with
about a third (8 percentage points) of the 25 percent rela-
tive fall in house prices linked to the excessive price
rises of the 1980s.15 Among cities upstate, the apparent
excesses of house prices relative to fundamental values
had the largest depressing effect on prices in Albany, at
13 percent, and the smallest effect in Rochester, at 
4 percent.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The relative weakness of Second District house prices
continued unabated in 1997. Over the four quarters of
the year, the median inflation-adjusted price of an exist-
ing single-family home rose 4 percent nationwide.
Meanwhile, house prices remained unchanged in the
New York metro area and fell 3 percent upstate. 
Table 4
House-Price Gaps in the Nation
and the Second District in the 1980s
Maximum Year of
Area Gap Maximum Gap 1989 Gap
Nation (forty-three cities) 2.2 1987 1.4
New York metro area 38.5 1987 20.2
Upstate New York 18.7 1988 17.4
Albany 31.1 1987 25.2
Buffalo 20.6 1989 20.6
Rochester 11.4 1987 7.4
Syracuse 19.4 1988 17.5
Notes:  The house-price gap represents the difference between the price of houses
and their estimated fundamental value. Fundamental values are calculated based
on the estimated coefficients in Table 2. House-price gaps are estimated for the
fourth quarter of the indicated year.Early in 1998, however, reports of rising home sales
and fast price growth in the New York City condo-
minium market appeared to signal a turnaround in
metro area price trends.16 Shortly thereafter, prices for
single-family homes in the metro area began to show
strength. By the end of the third quarter, real house
prices in the area had grown 5.4 percent from a year
earlier, compared with 3.3 percent growth for the nation
as a whole. Some of the relative improvement can be
attributed to stronger economic fundamentals. The
metro area’s unemployment rate fell more than 1 per-
centage point, while the fall nationwide came to less
than ½ percent. Similarly, early estimates indicate that
personal income grew ½ percent faster in the metro
area than it did in the nation.
The picture was different upstate, however. Although
house-price growth there also accelerated early in 1998,
it still lagged growth nationwide. Here again, the differ-
ence can be attributed to the behavior of fundamentals,
which continued to be relatively weak upstate.
Unemployment did fall upstate, but only by 0.2 percent;
this fall was less than half of the decline nationwide.
Likewise, estimated personal income growth upstate
fell short of national growth by more than ½ percent.
The close link between Second District fundamen-
tals and house-price growth during the past year sug-
gests that the hangover from excessive price rises in the
1980s may be coming to an end. This conclusion is
based on the fact that the behavior of economic funda-
mentals will more easily dominate the pattern of house-
price developments as the depressing effect of the
1980s boom on subsequent price growth diminishes
over time. The close link between fundamentals and
house-price growth is consistent with the model devel-
oped earlier, which implies that, more than ten years
after the peak of the 1980s boom, the depressing effects
of the boom should have faded substantially.
CONCLUSION
Following the boom period of the 1980s, house prices in
the Second District took a turn for the worse. Between
1990 and 1997, prices in the New York metropolitan area
declined 29 percent relative to prices in the nation, while
upstate New York saw relative prices fall 25 percent.
Weak economic fundamentals and the effects of exces-
sive house-price rises in the 1980s accounted in roughly
equal measure for the metro area’s disparity with the
nation. By contrast, these factors played considerably
smaller roles in explaining the relative weakness 
of house prices upstate. In 1998, the improvement in 
relative price performance in the New York metro area
can be traced to a concurrent improvement in the relative
performance of fundamentals.
—Matthew Higgins, Carol Osler, and Anjali Sridhar
NOTES
1. The Second District officially refers to New York State and cer-
tain New York City suburbs in Connecticut and New Jersey.
However, for statistical purposes, we use the term Second District to
refer to the New York metropolitan area and four major cities in
upstate New York. We define the New York metro area as New York
City, Nassau and Suffolk Counties, and four areas of New Jersey:
Bergen-Passaic, Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, Monmouth-
Ocean, and Newark. Our definition excludes Connecticut and most
small cities and rural areas.
2. Another potential fundamental is the actual supply of single-
family homes. Unfortunately, useful data are not available at the
metropolitan level.
3. We focus here on New York State, rather than the Second District,
because details of personal income by city are not available for
1997.
4. The unemployment rate and personal income are measured as dif-
ferences from city-specific averages. House-price expectations are
measured as the fitted values from a regression of house-price
growth on its own first two lags. Real personal income data come
from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Unemployment rate data come from the U.S. Department
of Labor. Construction costs are measured as the national construc-
tion cost index produced by McGraw-Hill, Inc., deflated by state
consumer price indexes from Data Resources International. Real
mortgage interest rates are calculated using regional thirty-year
fixed rates from the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market
Survey. These are deflated by expected inflation, which in turn is
calculated as the fitted value from a regression of current inflation
on two years of lagged inflation.
5. More formally, the inclusion of these variables can be justified by
the dividend discount model of asset prices (see Higgins and Osler
[1998]) or by the Capozza and Helsley (1989, 1990) models of
urban expansion (see Abraham and Hendershott [1996]). For tech-
nical reasons, all variables in our model except the unemployment
rate and the house-price gap are expressed as growth rates or, in the
case of interest rates, as simple changes.
6. See, for example, Linneman (1986), Case and Shiller (1991), and
Abraham and Hendershott (1996).
7.  Drawing on Abraham and Hendershott (1996), we used the fol-
lowing two-step estimation procedure: First, the model was esti-
mated without the house-price gap. The estimated coefficients were
then used to estimate a preliminary value of the gap, taking 1983 as
a base year during which the gap was assumed to be zero. Second,
we included the first estimate of the gap in the next round of esti-
mates, on the basis of which a more refined estimate of the gap was 
calculated. The second step was repeated until the estimated house-
price gap stabilized.
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8. If no relationship existed between fundamentals and house prices,
there would be less than a 1 percent chance of observing values as
large as those estimated.
9. To estimate the portion of house-price growth consistent with
fundamentals, we first calculate house-price growth predicted by
the model for each metro area. From this result, we subtract the por-
tion of house-price growth consistent with the house-price gap.
Note that, for this exercise, fundamental variables include a modi-
fied version of house-price expectations in which lagged fundamen-
tal price appreciation replaces lagged actual appreciation.
10. For the upstate region as a whole, fundamentals would have
been associated with a 4.2 percent increase in real house prices. For
Albany, the associated rise would have been 0.5 percent; for
Buffalo, 10.0 percent; for Rochester, 3.5 percent; and for Syracuse,
0.9 percent.
11. From 1983 to 1987, unemployment fell by 2.7 percent nation-
wide and by 2.5 percent in the New York metro area. During the
same period, real personal income grew by 17.5 percent nationwide
and by 15.8 percent in the metro area.
12. Between 1983 and 1989, unemployment fell by 3.1 percent in
both the nation and upstate New York. Over the same period, real
personal income grew by 25.7 percent nationwide and by 15.3 per-
cent in upstate New York.
13. The fact that one can never prove that a given boom-bust was
truly a speculative bubble was demonstrated by Hamilton and
Whiteman (1985). Many economists agree that even the most
extreme price rise followed by a precipitous decline could instead
have been driven by some unobserved fundamental factor.
14. The statistical test is a simple ordinary least squares regression
of the later price movements on the earlier ones. The t-statistic of the
primary regression coefficient, at 4.30, is significant at the 1 per-
cent level. The adjusted R-squared for this regression is 0.35.
Thirty-four cities are included in this sample.
15. We estimate the contribution of the 1980s price disequilibrium
to 1990s price growth by using the following procedure. First, we
calculate the house-price gap for 1989, and then use this result to
calculate the associated price decline in 1990, DPp. Next, we calcu-
late an adjusted house-price gap for 1990, which differs from the
actual house-price gap for that year in two ways. First, actual house
prices are replaced by a measure of the house prices that would have
been observed if the only influence on them over the past year had
been the previous year’s gap. More specifically, they are replaced by
the previous year’s price adjusted for the predicted change, DPp.
Second, the fundamental value for house prices that year is
adjusted slightly, so that expected house-price growth reflects the
simulated house-price level rather than the actual one. The proce-
dure is then repeated for each year from 1991 through 1997.
16. For example, see New York Times (1997, 1998a, 1998b).
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